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ABSTRACT 
 
Romantic Science: Science and Romance as Literary Modes in Sir Kenelm Digby’s 
Loose Fantasies and Two Treatises. (May 2009) 
Michael Streeter, B.A., University of St. Thomas 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Margaret Ezell 
 
 This thesis argues that 17th century polymath Sir Kenelm Digby treats his 
scientific discourses as psychological romances in his works Loose Fantasies and Two 
Treatises, with his use of courtly romantic tropes, and that a contemporary audience 
would have read Digby's scientific treatises as literary.  I first argue that science and 
romance in Digby’s narrative romance Loose Fantasies are literary modes of the text’s 
narrative form and that these modes are not mutually exclusive, since science is a 
“pyschodrama” to Digby, who is both the audience and author of these putative “private 
memoirs.”  I then relate Digby’s “romantic science” in Loose Fantasies to his “poetike 
Idea of science” in Digby’s Two Treatises in order to argue that while the treatise is 
traditionally received as a philosophical discourse, it is also a work of literary criticism.  
I conclude that Digby’s “poetike Idea of science” is always unstable, because Digby 
cannot choose between the primacy of language and ideas in human cognition, due to the 
rapid rationalistic developments in epistemology during his time. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite cropping up in almost every corner of the 17th century, Sir Kenelm 
Digby has received little critical attention in his own right in early modern literature 
studies.  Ernest Gilman, in his contribution to Opening the Borders, observes that while 
Digby “hardly stirs a glimmer of recognition today,” Digby “was no less celebrated than 
[William] Harvey” in his own time.1  Digby was, as Diane Purkiss describes, an “oddball 
and Catholic…a bold, sexy pirate, a wide reader…an even wider knower, an 
experimenter and scientist…and one of the most handsome and seductive men of his 
time.”2 Whether because of his patronage to such court figures as Ben Johnson or 
Anthony van Dyck, his battles at sea, his sensational marriage to Venetia Stanley, his 
copious library of medieval manuscripts, his poetry misattributed to John Donne, his 
paradoxical friendship with Oliver Cromwell, his sympathetic cure-all (a remedy that 
allegedly heals wounds remotely) or his co-founding of the Royal Society, Digby 
appears prolifically in 17th century literature as soon as you start looking for him.  
Curious, then, is the fact that the first book-length academic study of Digby’s life did not  
  
 
                                                
This thesis follows the style of the journal Isis: An International Review Devoted to the History of Science 
and Its Cultural Influences. 
1 Ernest Gilman, “The Arts of Sympathy: Dr. Harvey, Sir Kenelm Digby, and the Arundel Circle,” 
Opening the Borders: Inclusivity in Early Modern Studies, Essays in Honor of James V. Mirollo, ed. Peter 
C. Herman, (Newark: U of Delaware P, 1999), 265 
2 Diane Purkiss, The English Civil War: Papists, Gentlewomen, Soldiers, and Witchfinders in the Birth of 
Modern Britain, (London: HarperPress, 2006), 351 
 2 
occur until 19563 and in the last ten years, only about nine substantial studies on Digby 
have appeared.4 
 The established trend of opening the canon, however, is allowing us to engage 
eclectic writers like Digby from a literary perspective.  Now reaching the third decade of 
the movement, critics of the New Historicist and “Cultural Studies” camps seem to be 
revisiting form and genre.  Dissenting academic R.V. Young’s critique of New 
Historicism is relevant to this shift, if polemical: 
Now it is precisely for its high regard for literary quality that the New 
Criticism is currently disdained.  As Heather Dubrow and Richard Strier 
editors of a collection of New Historicist essays, aver in their 
introduction, “New Criticism distinguished and privileged ‘literary’ 
language, the characteristic richness and ambiguity with which literature 
was seen to render it a far fitter object of study than other types of texts, 
such as descriptions of cities or political tracts.”  Now we know 
better…In other words, the distinction between works of literature and 
what used to be called historical documents…is deprecated; whatever is 
written is a “text,” and all texts are equal…Perhaps the most revealing 
indicator of the situation is the number of college professors who seem to 
spend more time listening to hard rock and watching MTV than reading 
poetry.5 
                                                
3 R. T. Petersson, Sir Kenelm Digby: The Ornament of England 1603-1665, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 
1956. 
4 See A. Blank, "Composite Substance, Common Notions, and Kenelm Digby's Theory of Animal 
Generation," Science in Context 20.1 (2007): 1-20.  Jackson I. Cope, "Sir Kenelm Digby's Rewritings of 
His Life,” Writing and Political Engagement in Seventeenth-Century England, ed. Jackson I. Cope, Derek 
Hirst, and Richard Strier (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 52-68. Gilman, 265-97. Roland 
Hall, "Unnoticed Words and Senses from Sir Kenelm Digby," Notes and Queries 46.1 (1999): 21-22. 
Elizabeth Hedrick, "Romancing the Salve: Sir Kenelm Digby and the Powder of Sympathy," British 
Journal for the History of Science 41.149 (2008): 161. Eve Keller, “Embryonic Individuals: The Rhetoric 
of Seventeenth-Century Embryology and the Construction of Early-Modern Identity,” Eighteenth-Century 
Studies, 33.3 (2000): 321-48. Caleb Edward Mason, Conciliatory Eclecticism and the Philosophy of 
Kenelm Digby, (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2001). David Sellers, "A Letter from William Gascoigne 
to Sir Kenelm Digby," Journal for the History of Astronomy 37.4 (2006): 405. Roy Digby Thomas, Digby: 
The Gunpowder Plotter's Legacy, (London: Janus, 2001). Samuel Glen Wong, "Constructing a Critical 
Subject in Religio Medici," SEL, 1500-1900, 43.1 (2003), 117-36. 
5 R.V. Young, War against the Word (Wilmington, Delaware: ISI Books, 1999), 20. 
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One of the pitfalls of New Historicism has indeed been its levelling effect on texts—
literature is not distinguishable from historical documents.  The premises of New 
Historicism are not intrinsically evil, however, in spite of Young’s rhetoric.  Put another 
way, Stephen Cohen, in his introduction to Shakespeare and Historical Formalism6, 
argues that the “historicist literary criticism” of the 80s was never meant to exclude the 
formal characteristics that distinguish literature as literature in the first place: 
In practice, of course, none of these critical methods was so absolute as to 
exclude entirely either form or history. But...the critical and institutional 
rhetorics…were marked by a self-perpetuating cycle of exaggerations, 
misrecognitions, and demonizations…When it began its rapid rise to 
prominence in the early 1980s, New Historicism seemed poised to break 
this cycle…Though pointedly rejecting a New Critical 
formalism…[Greenblatt] concluded with an assertion of the importance 
of formal analysis to a truly historicist literary criticism…Nearly 25 years 
later, this promise of a historical formalism has gone largely unfulfilled.7 
“While (re)turning to matters of form,” this historical formalism—which scholars such 
as Dubrow, Strier and Jean Howard have themselves pioneered along with Cohen—
“seeks not to set aside but to capitalize upon the theoretical and methodological gains of 
New Historicism.”8  In this historical formalist context, Digby’s scientific work is not 
only a “social” or “cultural” text but a literary one, too.  Digby’s scientific discourse is 
valuable to us as literature scholars not just because it represents a voice of 17th century 
culture—indeed it does—but because the discourse participates in literary genres—in 
particular, the romance—and likewise does Digby’s literary romance/life writing Loose 
Fantasies participate in scientific discourse. 
                                                
6 Appropriate is the irony that this revision to an “historicist literary criticism” would occur in a 
compilation of Shakespearean essays. 
7 Stephen Cohen, Introduction, Shakespeare and Historical Formalism (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 
1-2. 
8 Ibid., 3. 
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 Yet the very terms of this overlap—science and literature—are variable.  The 
word science literally means “knowledge,” but knowledge can take different forms.  In 
our current generation, we tend to identify science with the natural sciences, at the 
expense of philosophy.  We also associate science with falsifiable theories—claims 
which can be proven false with empirical evidence.  Modern science also is less 
concerned with truth than with valid models; it is preoccupied with predictability, not 
veridicality.  In the early modern period, science was not such a specific discipline.  In 
the traditional sense, a science was a branch of knowledge in the universities, including 
theology, metaphysics and natural philosophy, with theology hailed as the “queen of the 
sciences”—though by the 19th century, mathematics would have usurped the title.9  New 
definitions of science were also competing with the traditional understanding.  Sir 
Francis Bacon, in his First Book of Aphorisms, argues that “as the present sciences are 
useless for the discovery of effects, so the present system of logic is useless for the 
discovery of the sciences”; we worship “idols” that bias our thinking.10 Rather, Bacon 
proposes, we should practice an eliminative logical induction for a true science, not 
deduction and neither additive induction; we should liberate ourselves from tradition.  
Bacon’s notion of science reached for a tabula rasa state of mind; although, as 
Descartes, and later Kant, Heidegger, Gadamer, et al., have pointed out, Bacon’s theory 
of science could not escape tradition because of the ineluctability of tradition.  Digby 
                                                
9 Attributed to Carl Friedrich Gauss in Sartorius von Waltershausen’s Gauss zum Gedächtniss, (1856), 79. 
10 Sir Francis Bacon, Novum Organum.  Aphorisms Book I—On the Interpretation and the Nature and the 
Empire of Man, ed. Joseph Devey (New York: P.F. Collier, 1902). 
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was familiar with this debate over science in his time, and his own position 
representative of this transition. 
Likewise is the term literature unstable because it is not mutually exclusive with 
the social or historical.  Although, as “New” New Critics like R.V. Young have 
observed, the creativity of literature is an expression of human free will and appeals to 
the universal human condition, this expression nonetheless works with conventions, 
which are socially constructed.  Perhaps no better example is Milton, who reveals a 
contemporary urgency through his manipulation of genre—Milton will parody epic 
sublimity through his celestial re-enactment of the English Civil War in Paradise Lost 
and question the definition of tragedy through his self-conscious drama in Samson 
Agonistes.  Fin de siecle critics, such as T.S. Eliot and G.K. Chesterton, have deprecated 
Milton precisely because he is so historically preoccupied, yet literary conventions are 
created in temporal moments by temporal agents.  As Sidney says in his Apology for 
Poesy, “poesy” is an “art of imitating nature,” not nature herself, “to teach and delight”; 
it contains not just the universal (“precepts”) but also the particular (“examples”).11 
Because literature contains such a confluence of the timeless and the temporal (social), 
its conventions vary according to period.  Thus, in 17th century England, certain genres, 
such as the novel, were still embryonic, while others, such as the epic, were reaching 
their climax; whereas now, the novel is an established genre, while the epic, an 
endangered, if not already extinct, genre (or perhaps now a mode). 
                                                
11 Sir Philip Sidney, An Apology for Poetry, Sir Philip Sidney’s An Apology for Poetry and Astrophil and 
Stella: Texts and Contexts, ed. Peter C. Herman (Glen Allen, VA: College Publishing, 2001), 66, 84. 
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Digby’s literary and scientific eclectism is primarily a product of two socio-
cultural conditions—Renaissance humanist theories of education and the expansion of 
audience due to printing.  As Elizabeth Spiller elaborates, to the humanist, “knowledge 
cannot be simply given to readers but must in some way be produced by them.”12 One 
thinks of Montaigne’s criticism of scholastic rote memorization in his essay “On the 
Education of Children”—“The usual way is to bawl into a Pupil’s ears as if one were 
pouring water into a funnel, and the boy’s business is simply to repeat what he is told”—
and even Socrates’ description of dialectic as a kind of midwifery for “giving birth” to 
knowledge.13 Though ironically accused of stunting learning precisely because of his 
emphasis on repetition, the Renaissance humanist believed that the reader must be an 
active student of the text in order to “copiously invent” knowledge, as Milton would 
say.14 A reader of scientific texts in the 17th century, then, would have been expected to 
“invent” knowledge in much the same way he would “beget” knowledge when reading 
poetry; he would be active, not passive.  Science is a kind of “journey” or psychodrama.  
As such, just as romance can be a literary genre (“the romance”) as well as a mode of 
narrative (“romantic”), so too can scientific discourse be a literary mode of narrative, not 
just a technical genre, in so far that scientific discourse is a psychodrama. 
                                                
12 Elizabeth Spiller, Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature: The Art of Making Knowledge, 1580-
1670, Cambridge Studies in Renaissance Literature and Culture 46 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004), 3. 
13 Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. Donald Frame (Stanford University 
Press, 1958), 54.  Plato, “Theaetetus,” Cratylus, Theaetetus, Sophist, Statesman, vol. 12 of Plato in Twelve 
Volumes, trans., Harold N. Fowler (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1921), 150b-151d. 
14 John Milton, “Of Education,” John Milton: Complete Poems and Major Prose, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes, 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1957). 
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Moreover, with the expansion of audience due to printing, Digby’s scientific 
treatises are marketed not just to humanist friends at Court but also to a popular 
audience, and so writing in literary modes, such as the romance, is all the more 
imperative.  As Juliett Cummins, David Burchell and others have argued, “the impact of 
natural philosophy on the early modern intellectual landscape depended on the effective 
use of rhetorical and even dramatic techniques to communicate and develop new 
ideas”15 Meetings at the Royal Society, which Digby himself co-founded, “often 
included grand dramatic spectacles designed to impress upon their viewers the gravity of 
the society’s undertakings.”16  At the risk of incurring Habermas’ critique of 
instrumentalism, scientific writing in early modern England exploits literary forms to 
communicate to a lay or skeptical audience. 
Digby’s texts seem conscious of these two classes of audience—the humanist 
and the popular (or as Digby would say, “the vulgar”).  Both communities of audience 
would have read Digby’s scientific treatises as a mythos, not a dry discourse.  Yet they 
would have appreciated Digby’s science as romantic for different reasons.  To the 
humanist, scientific treatises would be “romanced” because, as a psychodrama, the 
scientific discourse itself is a counterpart literary mode to the romance.  To a more 
popular audience, scientific treatises would be “romanced” not because the discourse is a 
psychodrama but precisely because the narrative and performative contexts of the 
discourse overshadow the discourse itself.  In other words, to a humanist audience, 
                                                
15 Juliet Cummins and David Burchell, Science, Literature and Rhetoric in Early Modern England, 
(Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), 2. 
16 Ibid., 1-2. 
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Digby’s scientific texts are romantic, because science is integrated with romance; to a 
popular audience, Digby’s scientific texts are romantic, because science is segregated 
from romance.  Andrew Mousley, in his dissertation, The Making of the Self: Life 
Writing in the English Renaissance, has argued that “Digby’s scientific and 
philosophical work constitutes itself in opposition to the ‘tall tales’ of romance and 
poetry at the same moment as it figures Digby in the role of an heroic adventurer’.”17 
Perhaps this tension is a reflection of the different understandings of “romantic science” 
to these two classes of audience. 
 My first chapter will argue that science and romance in Digby’s narrative 
romance Loose Fantasies are literary modes of the text’s narrative form and that these 
modes are not mutually exclusive, since science is a pyschodrama to Digby, who is both 
the audience and author of these putative “private memoirs.”  Chapter II will discuss 
how Digby’s Two Treatises is not only a philosophical discourse but also a work of 
literary criticism that figures metaphysical poetry in courtly romantic terms, as well as 
defends Digby’s “poetike Idea of science.”  Chapter III will shift focus from literary 
criticism to textual studies/early modern print culture.  I will argue that in the 1658 
edition of Digby’s publication A Late Discourse, a popular audience would have 
appreciated the “romance” of the text at the expense of its scientific discourse, because 
the text’s fossilization in written form (it was originally an oral delivery) encourages the 
rhetoric of the paratext to overshadow the scientific discourse of the actual content.  My 
fourth chapter will explain how Digby’s verbal disdain of poetry and rhetoric in his 
                                                
17 Andrew Mousley, “Kenelm Digby: Romance Autobiographer and Natural Philosopher,” The Making of 
the Self: Life Writing in the English Renaissance (PhD diss., University of Kent at Canterbury, 1990), 280. 
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Observation upon Religio Medici is directed only at a specific class of audience (“the 
vulgar”) and can cohere with Digby’s “romancing” of science.  I will conclude that 
Digby’s “poetike Idea of science” is always unstable, because Digby cannot choose 
between the primacy of language and ideas in human cognition, due to the rapid 
rationalistic developments in epistemology during his time. 
 10 
CHAPTER II 
LOOSE FANTASIES 
As the title of the work might imply, Loose Fantasies is a narrative romance 
loosely based off of Digby’s own life through age 25.  The plot centers around the 
digressive exploits of the hero, Theagenes (a fictional counterpart of Digby), who 
marries Stelliana (Digby’s wife, Venetia).  Although we cannot verify all the content of 
the work, we can assume that such tall tales as an inanimate lock of hair 
“shewing…sense” by changing the color of a flame or a Brahman summoning an 
“infernal spirit” maybe did not actually happen.18 These fabulous scenes are indeed 
literary conventions of the work’s genre as a romance, traditions which also appear in 
Heliodorus’ Aithiopika and Spenser’s Faerie Queene.  Apart from these fantastical 
moments, some of the more believable events of the story are at times questionable, too.  
We know that Digby has a tendency to exaggerate.  Elizabeth Hedrick’s recent study on 
Digby’s A Late Discours has averred that Digby’s “claim to priority” of the sympathetic 
cure-all is spurious—not to mention the efficacy of the cure-all in the first place—and 
Digby’s participation in the Duke of Buckingham’s train to Spain, as portrayed in Loose 
Fantasies, seems dubious.19 As Vittorio Gabrieli, editor of the only scholarly edition of 
Loose Fantasies, has judged: 
To recognize the autobiographical authenticity and grounding of the 
Fantasies does not of course justify us in taking for granted the 
‘literalness’ or historical reliability of all, or at least of most of the details 
                                                
18 Sir Kenelm Digby, Loose Fantasies, Temi e Testi 14, ed Vittorio Gabrieli (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e 
Letteratura, 1968), 67, 84. 
19 Elizabeth Hedrick, “Romancing the Salve: Sir Kenelm Digby and the Powder of Sympathy,” British 
Journal of the History of Science 41.2 (June 2008): 67.  Vittorio Gabrieli, Introduction to Loose Fantasies, 
Temi e Testi 14 (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1968), xxviii. 
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and episodes connected with the protagonists…Perhaps we should all 
more often call to mind what Sir Kenelm wrote on a page of his Two 
Treatises: <<Our brain is but a playhouse and a scene where all these 
fairy masks are acted>>.  He was referring to the fantasies that the outside 
world leaves in the imagination of man, but we may apply the remark 
more directly to the Loose Fantasies, in which Digby’s mind became the 
stage for re-enacting and transmogrifying his actual experiences.20 
None of which observations should diminish Digby’s stature as a romantic figure.  We 
do know that many of his stories are factual, such as his “brave and most resolute sea 
fight” and his “most couragious combat which he fought with the Lord Mount le 
Rosare” to name a couple.  The point, as Gabrieli has articulated, is that Loose Fantasies 
is a romance and Digby is exercising poetic license in creating an alternate universe of 
his life. 
Digby’s Loose Fantasies is not just a romance, though; it is an elite romance.  
Although Lori Newcomb has convincingly argued that popular and elite literature of 
early modern England are not segregated but co-dependent—indeed popular romance 
contributed to the rise of the English novel—no one in Digby’s lifetime probably ever 
read his Loose Fantasies.21 The narrative of Loose Fantasies is also so preoccupied with 
the courtier image of its hero, Theagenes, and so steeped in erudition, evoking a variety 
of literary references and discoursing in dense subjects of science and philosophy, that a 
popular audience probably would not be able to relate to much of the work. 
                                                
20 Gabrieli, xxvii-iii. 
21 Gabrieli, xi.  Lori Humphrey Newcomb, Reading Popular Romance in Early Modern England, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 
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In fact, this scientific and philosophical discourse is obsessive in Loose 
Fantasies.  Although philosophical and scientific discourse in fiction is not a novelty22, 
what is curious about Digby’s Loose Fantasies is the fact that this discourse is sustained 
and rigorous.  Nearly every page contains a metaphysical conceit, and philosophical 
dialogues abound, with Theagenes even engaging in a dense philosophical dialogue with 
a Hindu priest at one point.  Yet because Digby is both the author and audience of the 
text, this scientific rigor need not necessarily read like a dry scientific or philosophical 
treatise.  Rather, Digby, a humanist, would have read the philosophical and scientific 
discourse of his own work as romantic—as the speaker himself says, a kind of 
“journey.”23 The philosophical and scientific discourse of Loose Fantasies does not just 
overlap with but is integrated into the romance as a psychodrama, so much so that the 
scientific and the romantic are literary modes of a common form—narrative. 
The audience of Loose Fantasies seems to be a projection of Digby himself.  
Most critics of Loose Fantasies have concluded that the work was meant to be private, 
because the little that is known about the provenance of the manuscript suggests that 
Digby never shared it with anyone for circulation.  As Gabrieli explains, the only extant 
manuscript of Loose Fantasies is catalogued as Harley MS 6758 in the Bodleian Library 
and it appears in Digby’s own hand, though the manuscript could also be a second draft 
copied by a “professional scrivener.”24 “The earliest reference to the romance, as far as I 
am aware,” Gabrieli continues, “occurs in 1669, four years after Sir Kenelm’s 
                                                
22 Recall Raphael’s extended metaphysical discourse with Adam in book VIII of Milton’s PL, as well as 
Dante’s discourses throughout the Divine Comedy, especially in Paradiso.  Gabrieli identifies this 
tradition as “Virgilian” (Gabrieli, 190). 
23 Digby, Loose Fantasies, 3. 
24 Gabrieli, xiv-v. 
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death…referring to the Earl of Leicester’s papers at Holkham.”25 The first editor to 
publish the text, Nicholas Harris Nicolas, retitled the work Private Memoirs—along with 
castrating significant portions of the text to accommodate the Victorian sensibilities of 
his time—precisely because the text and the manuscript’s provenance bear no evidence 
of a public readership.  Gabrieli, although restoring the work’s original title, is inclined 
to agree that the manuscript never circulated in Digby’s lifetime, yet he does 
acknowledge that the manuscript “circulated among some people as early as 1669” after 
Digby’s death.26 According to the postscript, Digby composed the work as a “diversion” 
from seductive women while stranded on an island “and then continued and since 
preserved only for my own private content.”27 Gabrieli calls this confession “sincere,” 
and I have no reason to doubt his judgment, since, if the work did circulate, by now we 
would have found a contemporary reference to the work—especially as Digby’s other 
works are frequently referenced in his lifetime.  The text and its provenance, then, 
suggest that the text assumes an audience that would share Digby’s own intellectual 
eclectism—indeed, someone just like Digby himself (as Digby writes in his Two 
Treatises, “if the likenesse were complete in euery regard, then it were no longer to be 
called like, but the very thing it selfe”).28 
If the audience of Digby’s Loose Fantasies is a projection of Digby himself, then 
the main character of Loose Fantasies is also a (loose) fictional counterpart of Digby, a 
character who cultivates both the contemplative and active lives.  Like Digby, who, as 
                                                
25 Ibid., xi 
26 Ibid. 
27 Digby, Loose Fantasies, 173. 
28 Digby, Two Treatises, 357. 
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Diane Purkiss describes, was “a bold, sexy pirate, a wide reader…an even wider knower, 
an experimenter and scientist…and one of the most handsome and seductive men of his 
time,” Theagenes’ language is intellectual, saturated with lofty thoughts, yet just as lofty 
is the ambition of Theagenes and his outward acts. 29 In perhaps one of the most 
amusing, yet provocative, scenes of the romance, Theagenes, while in Morea (Spain), 
answers the Earl of Arcadia’s criticism of Theagenes’ magnanimity or “excess in the 
best and commendable things” by proposing to “make love to a mistress.”30 The Earl’s 
criticism is a backhanded recognition that Theagenes’ “excess in the best and 
commendable things” lies in the courtier’s celebration of both the active and 
contemplative lives.  Unlike “the ignorant vulgar, who judge by their senses without 
going much further,” the “perfect Courtier, the complete man,” as Gabrieli describes, 
referring to Castiliogne’s Book of the Courtier, “has been trained up” in “high 
contemplations,” as well as the “exercise of arms…as become a gentleman and a 
soldier.”31 At this point in the narrative, this acknowledgement comes as no surprise to 
us, since by now, Theagenes has exhibited his “high contemplations” (the contemplative 
life) in his dense metaphysical discourse with the Brachman and “exercise of arms” (the 
active life) in his heroic swordfight with some conspirators against Leodivius, the 
stepson of Theagenes’ relative Aristobulus (the Earl of Bristol). 
Curiously, Theagenes, in his response to the Earl, only defends the contemplative 
life, not the active life.  He attributes his “blessing” “to the sacred Muses,” the mythical 
                                                
29 Purkiss, 351. 
30 Digby, Loose Fantasies, 102-3. 
31 Ibid., 103.  Gabrieli, 195. 
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inspiration for contemplative activities, then boasts about the “soaring heights” of 
“spiritual speculations abstracted from gross matter.”32 He never makes any mention of 
the active life, only contrasting the contemplative life with “gross matter” or the 
passions—like seducing mistresses.  Such an interest in the contemplative life is 
consistent with Theagenes’ apprehensiveness of the active life just five pages earlier, 
when he tells Aristobulus that “the gentler Muses” are “enemies to the troubles and 
disquiets that accompany an active life.”33 Theagenes will participate in the active life 
but not for its own sake, as “an even mind and a quiet soul…will, and only can, make 
one happy in any fortune or vocation.”34 As the scholastic St. Thomas Aquinas argues, 
“sometimes a man is called away from the contemplative life to the works of the active 
life, on account of some necessity of the present life, yet not so as to be compelled to 
forsake contemplation altogether.” 35 
Although verbally Theagenes prefers the contemplative life, in practice, 
Theagenes enjoys the active life just as much.  Critics have called the narrative of Loose 
Fantasies “Platonic,” yet this description is not comprehensive.  It is just as much 
Aristotelian as it is Platonic for its celebration of civic virtue.  Theagenes, as a courtier, 
must practice what Castiliogne calls “a certain recklessness [sprezzatura] to cover art 
withall,” in order to exhibit, as Gabrieli says, “real gentility.”36  Thus, Theagenes’ self-
deprecation when approached by Aristobulus to accompany Hephaestion (the Duke of 
                                                
32 Digby, Loose Fantasies, 104 
33 Ibid., 98 
34 Ibid. 
35 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Latin Text and English Translation, Introductions, Notes, 
Appendices, and Glossaries (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), II.II.182.1. 
36 Castiliogne, Book I, The Book of the Courtier, trans. Sir Thomas Hoby (1561).  Gabrieli, 195 
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Buckingham) can be interpreted as an act of sprezzatura to conceal effort and ambition.  
A similar practice is evident when Theagenes must justify his voyage to the 
Mediterranean to Stelliana near the end of the romance: 
The sense of his honour came to his thoughts, and banished all weak 
tenderness out of his heart, so that he remained unmoveable in his 
resolutions, although he could not choose but grieve extremely at her 
sorrow…and make use of all the arguments that he could bethink himself, 
to induce her to endure his short absence with patience…acquainting her 
with the motives that induced him to undertake this voyage…Since that 
he was resolved to retire himself to a private life where, removed from 
the cumbersome distractions of the court or city, he might without any 
interruption enjoy the quiet blessings of her sweet conversation…But that 
if he should do it abruptly and of a sudden, it could not be without the 
impeachment of his honour [and worldly dignity]37 
Theagenes’ apparent “motive” not to “retire” from the active life “abruptly and of a 
sudden” is here reduced to one of many “arguments that he could bethink himself”; it is 
graceful rhetoric to conceal his true motive, which is to live an active life.  Yet this 
active life is not incompatible with his love for Stelliana, even if it requires him to travel 
abroad.  Earlier, Theagenes tells Stelliana that he “desires” to be “styled her knight, 
which title he would ever glory in and do her all the real services that it might challenge 
from him.”38 In order to perform courtly love, the hallmark of the romance, Theagenes 
must live an active life (cultivate civic virtue).  Thus, Digby himself, in the title page to 
his pamphlet “Sir Kenelm Digbeys Honour Maintained,” is depicted in a woodcut as 
dueling bravely with (and killing) the contemptuous Lord Mount le Ros and then 
described as now living in England “to his eternall honour” (Fig. 1).39  Though perhaps a 
                                                
37 Digby, Loose Fantasies, 163. 
38 Ibid., 107. 
39 Sir Kenelm Digby, “Sir Kenelme Digbeys Honour Maintained…” (London, 1641). 
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hyperbolic moment not so characteristic of sprezzatura (the audience of the pamphlet is 
also the popular reader, however), the point is that to be “styled” Stelliana’s “knight”—
Theagenes’ whole purpose in the narrative—Theagenes must pursue an active life; he 
must show outward bravery and virtue for the community. 
Such a chivalric worldview celebrating the active life does not necessarily 
contradict Theagenes’ preference for the contemplative life, and this paradox occurs 
precisely because Theagenes does not distinguish between the active and contemplative 
lives.  The active and contemplative lives are not separate ethics but two modes of the 
same ethic (virtue); they exist on a continuum of virtue.40  In the introduction to the 
romance, Digby figures mental activity (the contemplative life) in dramatic terms: 
But [rational agents] being composed of such differing parts, that one 
may well say they bear about within them a perpetual civil war—the 
rational part striving to preserve her dignity and the superiority due to her, 
as being the nobler substance; and the inferior part, wherein reign the 
mists and clouds of various and inconstant passions…Which hath made 
me…fix [my looser thoughts] upon this subject, through the desire I have 
had to direct this my journey in a right way, which is of so much 
importance that the least going astray out of the true path brings a 
continual sickness to the mind41 
                                                
40 Given Digby’s macrocosmic-microcosmic worldview, Digby’s collapsing of distinctions between the 
active and contemplative lives would seem to make his metaphysics monist, yet it does not seem to.  
Though an atomist, Digby defended a dualistic metaphysics in his Two Treatises. The closest he comes to 
flirting with monism is in the Brachman scene in Loose Fantasies.  During Theagenes’ conversation with 
the Brachman, they engage in an extended discourse about how celestial or spiritual creatures (angelic 
intelligences and even demons) can act on sublunary matter, given their substantial divide.  The Brachman 
proposes three metaphysical explanations for this phenomenon, an animus mundi, materialist monism and 
dualism, but concludes that the question is speculation of the unknown (81).  Perhaps Digby would not see 
a tension here.  In Two Treatises, after expressing contradictory beliefs in direct realism and indirect 
realism in the prefaces of each Treatise, Digby concludes that the “quarrell…be only about the word, not 
about the matter: and that indeede, both of vs, do meane the same” (201).  Further research might want to 
compare Digby to monists like Spinoza, Anne Conway and Milton. 
41 Digby, Loose Fantasies, 2-3. 
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The narrator’s characterization of the contemplative life in terms of the active life 
indicates no substantial difference between the two.  Echoing the opening lines of 
Dante’s Inferno, cultivating a proper interior life is no less romantic than the pursuits of 
the active life; it is a “journey” and at times even a “civil war” (recall the “exercise of 
arms…as become a gentleman and a soldier”); it is a kind of psychodrama.42 The active 
life performs virtuous actions, which presuppose wisdom or true knowledge, and the 
contemplative life requires a virtuous state of mind in order to see through falsehood and 
participate in the heavenly community (God’s kingdom)—mens sana in corpore sano. 
Not only is the contemplative life like the active life as a psycho-drama, but this 
psycho-drama is chivalric—one’s intellectual pursuits are a graceful service.  In the 
opening to Digby’s Observations on Spencer’s Faerie Queene, Digby displays more 
sprezzatura by deprecating himself (“I am too well acquainted with the weaknesses of 
mine abilities…to flatter my self with the hope I may either inform your understanding”) 
with the same formula Theagenes does to Aristobulus (“My own imperfections, much 
honoured Lord, are so apparent to me who am daily conversant with them”).43 Yet in this 
instance, the feigned disgracing is not meant to conceal an ambition for the active life 
but Digby’s effort at composing the explication (at the end of the work, Digby presents 
his 25 page criticism having been written “the first halfe quarter of an houre” “without 
having reduced it to any better form”).44 Digby views his (contemplative) task of 
                                                
42 As Elizabeth Spiller explains, to the Renaissance humanist, the discovery of knowledge is an act of 
“invention,” a begetting of ideas through midwifery (dialectic), which requires active participation of the 
student.  Digby is taking this conception a step further (Spiller, 3) 
43 Sir Kenelm Digby, “Observations on the 22. stanza in the 9th. canto of the 2d. book of Spencers Faery 
Queen…” (London, 1643), 1-2.  Digby, Loose Fantasies, 98. 
44 Digby, “Observations,” 25. 
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explicating the lines from Spenser’s Faerie Queen as a gentlemanly service to a friend 
(“obedience to your command weigheth much more with me, then the lawfulnesse of 
any excuse can”) but also to truth (“I am so desirous you should be possest with the true 
knowledge”).45  In short, just as Theagenes serves Stelliana as a “knight,” so too, under 
this romantic conception of the contemplative life, does the “complete man” serve truth 
as a knight or a gentleman. 
This service is romantic because it is an act of love.  In the introduction to Loose 
Fantasies, the narrator gives us love as the model for virtue: 
But at length I perceived that that Infinite Light, which illumineth all 
things, is never wanting to illustrate such a mind as with due humility and 
diligence maketh itself fit to receive it: for it was not long before such an 
example occurred to me…It was the perfect friendship and love of two 
generous persons, that seemed to be born in this age by ordinance of 
heaven to teach the world anew what it hath long forgotten, the mystery 
of loving with honour and constancy, between man and woman; both of 
them in the vigour of their youth, and both blessed by nature with 
eminent endowments, as well of the mind as of the body46 
Both the active and contemplative lives serve the same principle—“loving with honour 
and constancy.”  Following the great chain of being, the love between the mind and body 
(a hypostatic union) is a microcosm of the love between man and woman and likewise is 
the love between man and woman a microcosm of the love between God and man.  As a 
refraction of God, the divine Stelliana (Theagenes’ Beatrice) is not incompatible with 
divine Truth.  Theagenes, though he has his failures, subscribes to a Christian humanism 
that sanctifies the world, glorifying both the internal (contemplative) and external 
(active) as a romance. 
                                                
45 Ibid., 1-2. 
46 Digby, Loose Fantasies, 5. 
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Just as the active and contemplative lives are two modes of the same practice of 
virtue, even so are science and romance two literary modes of narrative, because science 
is a psychodrama or psycho-narrative.  When the Earl of Arcadia deprecates Theagenes’ 
“higher contemplations,” he cites Theagenes’ “train[ing] up continually in scholastical 
speculations.”  Scientific and philosophical discourse or “scholastical speculations” are 
an activity of the contemplative life.  By the same token, the romance of Theagenes’ 
“exercise of arms…as become a gentleman and a soldier” and his courtship of Stelliana 
(as opposed to Mardontius’ seduction of Stelliana, a pursuit of the passions or “grosser 
matter”) are a practice of the active life.  As manifestations of the active and 
contemplative lives, science and romance, in the narrative text, Digby would have read 
(and written) them as literary modes.  Thus, the scientific discourse is not an out-of-
place digression but another way of executing drama.  The discourse demands a moral 
awareness of the reader, and the reader must act out, in his own mind, the very scientific 
demonstrations in the text, just as he would imagine the fictions of the text, lest the 
reader succumb to error and lose his love, truth. 
According to this doctrine of romantic science, scientific rigor is just as 
magnanimous as the bravery of arms.  In the final sentences of Digby’s A Late Discours, 
Digby, perhaps channeling the Brachman scene of Loose Fantasies, Digby critiques 
thinkers who would resort to superstition: 
Now it is a poor kind of pusillanimity, and faintnesse of heart, or rather a 
grosse ignorance of the Understanding, to pretend any effects of charm or 
magick herein, or to confine all the actions of Natre, to the grossenesse of 
our senses, when we have not sufficiently considered, nor examined the 
true causes and principles whereon tis fitting we should ground our 
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judgement: we need not have recourse to a Demon or Angel in such 
difficulties.47 
Digby’s use of the word “pusillanimity” is provocative.  Before preparing to embark for 
his voyage to the Mediterranean in Loose Fantasies, the speaker describes Theagenes as 
having “equal constancy and magnanimity [to] overcome the many difficulties and 
oppositions that occurred to him.”48 Intellectual dedication, according to this ethic, is 
magnanimous because it requires the same bravery of spirit that a gentleman trained in 
arms does.  If resorting to supernatural explanations for phenomena is the sign of 
“pusillanimity” or “faintness of heart,” being able to persevere intellectually for rational 
explanations to the world is the sign of greatness of heart, of the romantic love of truth. 
To Digby, this integration of science and romance, whether in Loose Fantasies or 
his scientific treatises, would be no different than John Donne’s metaphysical poetry.  In 
fact, much of the scientific language in Loose Fantasies performs double duty—to 
communicate a discourse, as well as to create poetry.  In his first spoken lines of the 
work, after Stelliana insists that she is unworthy of Theagenes’ love, Theagenes protests: 
You would do too great a wrong, fairest Stelliana…to my clear flame, if 
at least any injustice can proceed from so divine a hand, in thinking that 
there were need of any other motive for me to love you but yourself: for 
angels and souls love where they discover greatest perfections, and I were 
too blind if I did not discern yours.  So that in me, where knowledge and 
understanding is the ground of a noble and spiritual love, and other 
obligations are scarcely considerable; for that knowledge and love have 
converted me into a part of you, and your goodness having united you to 
me, I can no more give you thanks for any merit towards me49 
                                                
47 Sir Kenelm Digby, A Late Discourse Made in a Solemne Assembly of Nobles and Learned Men at 
Montpellier in France Touching the Cure of Wounds by the Powder of Sympathy (London, 1658), 81-2. 
48 Ibid., 163. 
49 Ibid., 37. 
 22 
Theagenes’ language is eloquent—direct (“You would do too great a wrong”), yet 
delicate (“if at least any injustice can proceed from so divine a hand”), philosophical, yet 
poetic (“angels and souls love where they discover greatest perfections”).  A few scenes 
later, after Theagenes believes Stelliana has betrayed him, he even dramatizes a 
metaphysical conceit: 
yet, thus much I will swear…I will have irreconcilable wars with that 
perfidious sex; and so blaze through the world their unworthiness and 
falsehood, that I hope their turn will come to sue to men for their love, 
and being denied, despair and die.  And thou, once dear pledge of my 
lady’s virgin affections, but now the magical filter of her enchanting and 
siren-like beauty, thou canst witness how I have, day and night, ever since 
I wore thee, sighed her name; be now her forerunner into the fire, that 
will one day torment her traitorous soul; and as thou consumest there like 
a sacrifice to the infernal furies, of whom only vengeance is begged, and 
that thy grosser element turneth into ashes, may thy lighter and airy parts 
mingle itself with the wind, and tell her from me that when rage and 
despair have severed my injured soul from my cold limbs, my ghostly 
shadow shall be every where present to her.50 
The language is musical (“and being denied, despair and die,” “once dear 
pledge,” “her forerunner into the fire,” “torment her traitorous soul,” “sacrifice to the 
infernal furies,” etc.) and at the same time metaphysical (“and that thy grosser element 
turneth into ashes, may thy lighter and airy parts mingle itself with the wind”).  Gabrieli 
identifies Donne’s “The Bracelet” and “The Apparition” as analogues to the lock of hair 
and Theagenes’ “ghostly shadow every where present to her,” and the observation is apt.  
The resemblance between Donne’s “metaphysical poetry”—though an anachronistic 
phrase—and Digby’s romantic science is not a coincidence.  Both styles are emerging at 
a time when distinctions between the scientific and the literary are confused.  The next 
                                                
50 Ibid., 67. 
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chapter will investigate how these same modes of scientific discourse and romance 
manifest themselves in a different genre—the scientific treatise. 
 
 24 
CHAPTER III 
DIGBY’S “POETIKE IDEA OF SCIENCE” IN TWO TREATISES 
Other than his work on his sympathetic cure-all, Digby’s magisterial discourse 
on natural philosophy and metaphysics, Two Treatises, is perhaps Digby’s most well 
known book for its thorough engagement of the scientific conversations of the day.  
Between his itinerant lifestyle of rallying support for the Royalist cause as Chancellor to 
Queen Henrietta Maria and acting as a Catholic agent for Rome, Digby composed his 
magnum opus in the 1640s, which text exceeds 450 pages, two thirds of which discuss 
physical bodies and the last third of which discusses the immortality of the soul and her 
faculties. 51 The work is one of the first texts to defend the physician William Harvey’s 
theory of the circulation of the blood;52 it reiterates Digby’s theory for his sympathetic 
cure-all/“weapon’s salve”;53 it expresses an atomist theory of matter and attempts to 
adapt an Aristotelian metaphysical scheme to contemporary scientific theories, 
especially those of Paracelsus, Descartes, Bacon, Hobbes and Harvey.54 
The work is also intriguing for its philosophical indeterminacy.  In an era when 
scientific discoveries were challenging traditional conceptions of the universe—whether 
Ptolemaic cosmogony, the great chain of being or the spirituality of man—Two 
Treatises, like much of the literature of the 17th century, typifies the general 
philosophical incertitude of the period.  Roy Digby Thomas, the most recent biographer 
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of Digby, as well as a descendent of Digby, writes that Two Treatises “was nothing less 
than an attempt to make sense and order of the universe, yet ultimately Kenelm could 
not distinguish clearly enough the rational, precise and material scientific world from his 
rather rigid, preconceived spiritual and religious views.”55 R.T. Petersson concurs that 
“for Digby the personal conflict between religion and science was for ever 
unresolved.”56 
Aside from the intrigue of the scientific content of the text, the publication 
history of the book is interesting in its own right as well for constituting the received 
identity of the book.  The work was first published in Paris in 1644, then reprinted in 
London in 1645, 1658, 1665 and 1669.57  As Adrian Johns explains, in his 
comprehensive tome on printing in the English 17th century, The Nature of the Book, 
neither Digby nor the state licensers had any authority over the printing of Two 
Treatises.58 “At least two English editions followed rapidly” from the French edition, 
Johns says.  “One was produced by George Thomason and Octavian Pulleyn, the other 
by Francis Egglesfield, Edward Blackmore, and John Williams.  Their consequent 
confrontation helped to define the identity of the work.”59 Both groups of printers were 
competing for the exclusive rights to print Two Treatises, with Thomason and Pulleyn 
attempting to get it licensed as a philosophy publication, and Egglesfield, et al. trying to 
get it licensed as a divinity publication.  Ultimately, the Stationers Company ruled that 
                                                
55 Thomas, 191. 
56 Petersson, 210. 
57 Kenneth Garth Huston, Sir Kenelm Digby: Checklist. 5.  
58 Johns, 238. 
59 Ibid., 236. 
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only the Thomason and Pulleyn edition was authorized, and Two Treatises was officially 
registered as a philosophy publication, not a divinity publication. 
Though traditionally received as a philosophical discourse, Digby’s Two 
Treatises is nonetheless a work of literary criticism, too.  Nearly an entire chapter of the 
second treatise after all consists of a discussion of rhetoric and poetry.  The work, then, 
is of value not just to philosophers, book historians and historians of science but also to 
literature scholars.  With this interest of Two Treatises’ literary criticism in mind, I 
would like to argue that Two Treatises, in spite of Digby’s protest that different theories 
of cognition are inconsequential, constantly revises its theories of cognition in order to 
accommodate what Digby calls his “poetike Idea of science.” 
The term “discourse” in the 17th century connotes at least two meanings in 
relation to human actions—the faculty of reasoning and communication with words.  
The word derives from the Latin noun discursus or “running to and fro” and in addition 
to its more familiar meaning as a human action, “discourse” also refers to the more 
general sense of a “succession of time.”60 According to the OED, the earliest known 
precedent of the word “discourse” occurs in Book V of Chaucer’s translation of 
Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy when Lady Philosophy is elaborating on the nature 
of God’s foreknowledge or “prescience,” “but it [the Intelligence] biholdeth alle things, 
so I shal seye, by a stroke of thought formerly, withoute discours or collacioun.”61 In 
this context, the word is referring to the faculty of reasoning unique to human minds, as 
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61 Ibid. 
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opposed to God’s Providence or angelic intuition.  This use of the word “discourse” 
persists through the 17th century and usually occurs in philosophical contexts like 
Chaucer’s translation of Boethius, such as the second elegy to Sir John Davies Nosce 
Teipsum, “The Immortality of the Soul,” “Nor can herself discourse or judge of ought, 
But what the sense collects.”  The other, perhaps more common, meaning of the word 
refers to human conversation and by the 16th century, begins to replace the Middle 
English word “spelling,” which also meant “the act of speaking; an utterance, instance of 
speech, discourse.”62 Thus, Sir Francis Bacon’s essay “Of Discourse,” even though it 
does allude to the meaning of discourse as an act of the mind, reflects on discourse 
primarily as a speech act. 
Such semantic ambiguity of the word “discourse” reveals an epistemological 
primacy of cognition over language.  In St. Thomas Aquinas’ Summa, the Doctor of the 
Church insists on a difference between the act of reason (discourse as a mental act) and 
the product of that act (discourse as a speech act), “we may consider the work and the 
work done, for instance the work of building and the house built; so in the acts of reason, 
we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something 
produced by this act.”63 In these terms, discourse, qua an act of the mind, is the cognitive 
“work of building” understanding before that understanding is fashioned in words, while 
discourse, qua a speech act, is the verbal “product” of the mind’s work of 
understanding.64 When we experience the phenomenon of having thoughts with the 
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words on the tip of our tongues, as they say, we can ascertain this distinction between 
mental and verbal discourse.  Paralleling this distinction, to a scholastic like Aquinas, is 
the difference between a concept and a logical term, an act of judgment and a logical 
proposition and ultimately, an act of reasoning and a logical syllogism.  The latter terms 
in these pairings (term, proposition and syllogism) are merely logical (or verbal) 
expressions of pre-existing acts of the mind (a concept/simple apprehension, judgment 
and reasoning), which inform the logical expressions.  As students, like Digby, in 
Oxbridge in the 17th century were still being educated in this scholastic tradition,65 even 
with the rise of reform schools during this period, many students of philosophy not only 
would have recognized a distinction between discourse as a cognitive act and discourse 
as a speech act but would have privileged cognition as the origin of language, which 
only represents reality and does not constitute it. 
In the scholastic tradition, because cognition includes both intellectual and 
sensory activity, discourse as a cognitive act can make reality claims outside of one’s 
subjectivity.  As Existential Thomists Fr. Joseph Owens and John F.X. Knasas have 
reasoned, sensation participates in human cognition just as much as ideas do, because the 
human mind directly apprehends external reality.66 “Knowledge is regulated according 
as the thing known is in the knower,” as Aquinas says.67 Recurrent in Aquinas’ works is 
an emphatic use of the verb “to be” or esse.  Though on one hand the use of “to be” 
reflects a stylistic preference for plain writing, the diction also echoes a philosophical 
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understanding of esse—or the act of existence—as a sui generis, a class unto itself that is 
ineluctable.  If the materialist reduces all of reality to matter, the scholastic Thomist 
reduces all of reality to existence.  Fr. Owens explains: 
Cognition, then, has to be explained in terms of existence.  The house 
exists in itself, but also exists in the awareness of the one perceiving or 
knowing it…This traditional explanation of cognition as a way of 
existence is strange at first to those who approach it from a background of 
modern or postmodern philosophy.  But it fits normally into an 
Aristotelian or Scholastic setting.68 
External reality has a real presence in the mind, just as much as the Body of Christ 
would have a Real Presence in the Eucharist, and this cognitive existence of reality is 
received, in Aristotelian hylomorphic parlance, formally or immaterially.69 The co-
existence of the self and external reality in the same form (the human mind) is possible 
without the destruction of the self because of what Aristotle calls an “amplitude” of form 
over matter. 70 Thus, this direct realist model of cognition, where the mind literally 
becomes the very objects it senses—or what Owens and Knasas call “the primacy of the 
external”71—expands the parameters of cognition beyond mere ideas or notions to 
external reality.  Such an assertion has profound consequences for discourse, because it 
allows a subject to make external reality claims with certitude.  A privileging of 
cognition over language, then, need not result in a Cartesian solipsism, so long as 
cognition includes more contents than mere ideas. 
This broader understanding of cognition adds an exception to the modern 
discourse studies’ narrative of cognition consisting of only ideas and language.  
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According to Michel Foucault’s narrative, the Renaissance “episteme,” or system of 
knowledge, differs from the “Classical” (or Cartesian) framework of cognition (or 
“thought”), because the Renaissance episteme does not subordinate language to ideas; 
language permeates the world and is the basis for knowledge, in large part because of the 
liber mundi (the “book of nature”) trope/analogy.72 With the introduction of Descartes’ 
cogito and dualism, the grounds for knowledge shift interiorly to the mind, with 
language as a mechanical instrument for expression and ideas as its governor.  Only in 
postmodernity does language regain its primacy not only as the center of cognition, as in 
the Renaissance, but as a constitutive, not just representative, principle of meaning to 
Foucault.73 Yet, as Ian Maclean has observed, Foucault’s narrative assumes a “Platonist” 
debate over cognition, at the neglect of the Aristotelian or empiricist tradition that just as 
much informs the debate in the early modern period.74 In other words, the terms of the 
debate over cognition consist not only of ideas and language but also things themselves 
or external reality.  If Renaissance thinkers held the principle of the “primacy of the 
external”—at least those thinkers with an Aristotelian bent—then Foucault perhaps 
overstates his case that language in the Renaissance is the focus of cognition.  Just 
because ideas are not privileged over language does not eliminate external reality itself 
as a contender with language in cognition.  Nevermind language in the Renaissance 
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being only representative, not constitutive, language, among philosophers in the 
Aristotelian and Thomistic traditions, was not even of central importance to cognition. 
The “book of nature” metaphor, the basis for Foucault’s narrative of the 
Renaissance, is variable after all.  The trope refers to the Christian precept of the natural 
world in some way reflecting God’s law or Revelation, as the law of God is “written” in 
the “hearts” of man.75 The nature of this analogy between the physical world and 
Revelation, however, differs according to its use.  As Peter Harrison argues, in his essay, 
“‘The Book of Nature’ and Early Modern Science,” “close examination of these ‘book’ 
metaphors…reveals a remarkable diversity of meanings and contexts”—especially 
between the Middle Ages and Renaissance because of the rise of Protestantism.76 The 
“book of nature” metaphor is not a unified tradition not only between the Middle Ages 
and Renaissance, though, but even within the Middle Ages and Renaissance periods 
themselves.  To some traditions, such as Thomism, the metaphor would merely mean 
that nature is in harmony with Scripture.  Thus, nature is a book in so far that it coheres 
with the Book of God or in Harrison’s terms, nature is a “mirror.”  As Aquinas says in 
his Summa contra Gentiles when reconciling philosophy with theology, “Sacred writings 
are bound in two volumes, that of Creation and that of Holy Scripture.”77 Others, such as 
Paracelsus,78 would have extended the metaphor more literally to conclude that nature, 
as a “book,” must be “read.”  In other words, nature is never just sensed but always 
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perceived or interpreted; reality can never be experienced directly (as it is) but must 
always be decoded or, as Husserl might say, “bracketed.”  This latter tradition of the 
liber mundi metaphor precludes the “primacy of the external,” as our minds or 
subjectivity are always judging (or projecting onto) the external and, thus, subordinating 
it. 
To this latter phenomenological tradition of nature always undergoing 
interpretation do most literature, linguistic and discourse studies narratives point.  As 
R.V. Young insists, in At War with the Word, Logos is the fundamental principle of 
Christian theology—“in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and 
the Word was God.”79 Logos, however, does not just mean language or “words” but also 
ideas; hence the distinction between logos and lexis.  In other words, while this 
phenomenological tradition of nature as an “interpreted” book is valid, it is not a 
comprehensive representation of Renaissance thought, because the liber mundi 
metaphor, like the term logos, carries more than one meaning.  Most scholars of 
literature seem naturally attracted to this phenomenological tradition, however, because 
it privileges language (the elemental principle of literature) over any other principle 
(whether ideas or external reality).  If external reality consists of signs or a kind of 
language, then this view expands the territory of literature scholars in their enterprise for 
interdisciplinary studies—an effort that, at the risk of sounding provincial, at times 
seems insidiously imperialistic for stealing jurisdiction from philosophy.  Not a 
coincidence is the irony that R.V. Young, in spite of his self-proclaimed “logocentrism,” 
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admittedly shares nearly as much in common with Derrida as Augustine.80 In a similar 
context, John F.X. Knasas characterizes the post-Vatican II preference Transcendental 
Thomism—or what he paradoxically calls “Augustinian-Kantian Thomism”—as a 
preference for the romantic over philosophy: 
because of its relentless a posteriori approach, neo-Thomism appears as 
so cool and detached as to be singularly unappealing. In contrast, 
Transcendental Thomism provides an engaging portrayal of our inner life 
as conscious beings. The description of human nature as radically 
orientated to God, as naturally desiring God, is enticing and flattering. It 
seems to ring true to our felt dissatisfaction with our existence, and it 
does seem to express the agreement we all concede when reading 
Augustine's "My heart is restless until it rests in You.” 
The belief that language (logos) permeates the world is a romantic worldview, because 
external reality, now as a sign, becomes more of a mystery; it is unknown, occult—a 
secret to be discovered. 
Like the varying receptions of the “book of nature” metaphor and Logos, Kenelm 
Digby’s theory of cognition, in his Two Treatises, is divided between the traditions of 
Thomism (a preference for the external) and Cartesianism (a preference for ideas).  
Especially as a practicing Catholic (at least except for his brief conversion to 
Anglicanism), Digby sympathizes with Thomism, often invoking Aquinas and Aristotle 
in his works.  In his chapter on “Local Motion,” Digby adduces Aquinas, Aristotle and 
“their intelligent commentatours” when maintaining his insistence—to the point of 
obsession, as he repeats the rule in nearly every chapter—that “qualities” or “accidents” 
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have no autonomous existence.81 Yet Digby is not consistently Thomist or Aristotelian.  
A case in point is Digby’s conflicting views of realism.  In the beginning of the first 
treatise, “Of Bodies,” Digby articulates an indirect realist theory of cognition: 
It is true, wordes serue to expresse thinges: but if you obserue the matter 
well; you will perceiue they doe so, onely according to the pictures we 
make of them in our owne thoughts, and not according as the thinges are 
in theire proper natures. Which is very reasonable it should be so; since 
the soule, that giueth the names, hath nothing of the thinges in her but 
these notions, and knoweth not the thinges otherwise then by these 
notions: and therefore can not giue other names but such as must signify 
the thinges by mediation of these notions.82 
According to this account of cognition, “notions” in the mind—or a species expressa in 
scholastic parlance—mediate the soul’s simple apprenehsion of the external world, so 
that the external is never directly known but experienced through signs.  Yet in the 
chapter on “Simple Apprehensions” of the second treatise, “The Nature and Operations 
of Man’s Soul,” Digby advocates for a Thomistic direct realist theory of cognition to 
argue that “the very nature of a thing apprehended, is truly in the man, who doth 
apprehend it.”83 In a rather unconvincing attempt to reconcile this discrepancy, Digby 
concludes at the end of the preface to the second treatise that the “quarrell…be only 
about the word, not about the matter: and that indeede, both of vs, do meane the same.”84 
While Digby verbally asserts that indirect and direct realist views of cognition are 
ultimately synonymous, this resolution is neither so facile, nor genuine. 
Yet just as attracted is Digby towards a preference for the primacy of language in 
cognition.  In his chapter “Of Discourse” in the second treatise, Digby equivocates on 
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the word “discourse” in order to assert the ubiquity of the act and, thus, science, which 
depends on discourse.  Throughout the chapter “Of Discourse,” Digby refers to the acts 
of the mind in logical terms, describing judgments as “propositions,” simple 
apprehensions as “terms,” discourses as “syllogisms.”  Such language indicates that 
Digby is referring to discourse as a speech act, not a cognitive act.  “The first and most 
simple of perfect discourses,” Digby says, is that “which Logitians call a syllogisme.”85 
Digby continues in order to argue that “Now these Syllogismes, that the life of man as 
man, doth consist in discourse, and of the vast extent of being as it were interlaced and 
wouen one within an other…do breede, or rather are all the variety of mans life.”86 
Digby is not just referring to discourse as a speech act here; he is collapsing the 
distinction between speech acts and cognitive acts.  To Digby, the “variety of man’s 
life”—or perhaps cognitive life or awareness—consists entirely of epicheirema or 
clusters of syllogisms, “interlaced and wouen one with an other.”  All discourse is, to 
Digby, is a “long chaine” of syllogisms or speech acts.  Digby’s nominalist view of 
discourse as a speech act culminates in Digby’s discussion of “locution” or speaking: 
it were a great ouersight to forgett that faculty…and that is, the power of 
speech…It consisteth in two actions: the one outward, the other inward: 
the outward, is the giuing of various soundes to our breath…I am 
persuaded, the like might be effected by insensible creatures, if a 
dexterous man would employ his time, in contriuing and making an 
instrument to expresse those different soundes…The inward action of 
locution, is the framing of conuenient answeres to what is asked; of fitt 
replies to what is said; and in a word, to speake appositely, and to the 
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purpose; wherevnto, neyther beast nor dead instrument can be brought, 
vnlesse the artificier be able to endue it with vnderstanding.87 
Digby conclusion that irrational animals can only imitate the “outward” mechanical act 
of language, not the “inward” act is based off of Descartes’ reasoning from Discourse on 
Method, that “Reason is an universal instrument that is alike available on every occasion, 
these organs, on the contrary, need a particular arrangement for each particular action” 
and, thus, as physical parts, would need to be in infinite supply to substitute for the role 
of reason, an immaterial faculty.88 More importantly, however, Digby argues that even 
mental discourse or “the framing of conuenient answers” is an “action of locution.”  In 
short, by labeling mental discourse as “inward locution,” Digby is blurring the 
distinction between discourse as a speech and cognitive act. 
Perhaps because of his fear of losing romance along with the primacy of 
language does Digby deny any difference between discourse as a speech act and a 
cognitive act, even at the expense of the consistency in his beliefs.  If discourse consists 
entirely of words (or “syllogisms”) after all, then the center of cognition is neither the 
external world, as Digby argues in the beginning of the second treatise, nor ideas, as 
Digby argues in the beginning of the first treatise.  By sacrificing his already 
contradictory subscriptions to Thomism and Cartesianism—at least in this instance—
Digby is retaining what he calls a “poetike Idea of science” that privileges language in 
human thought.  Critics have described Two Treatises as “rationalistic,” hyper-
intellectual and hostile to the poetic language that Thomas Browne adopts in Religio 
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Medici.89 Yet in one of the richest passages from the Two Treatises for its multiple 
implications, Digby reveals that if his science has any vulnerability, it is too poetic, for 
claiming that “knowledge hath no limits; nothing escapeth the toyles of science”: 
And if any man, that is not invred to raise his thoughts aboue the pitch of 
the outward obiects he conuerseth dayly with, should suspect that what I 
haue now said, is rather like the longing dreames of passionate louers, 
whose desires feede them with impossibilities, then that it is any reall 
truth; or should imagine that it is but a poetike Idea of science, that neuer 
was or will be in act: or if any other, that hath his discoursing faculty 
vitiated and peruerted, by hauing beene imbued in the schooles with 
vnsound and vmbratile principles, should persuade himselfe, that 
howsoeuer the pretenders vnto learning and science, may talke loude of 
all thinges, and make a noise with scholastike termes, and persuade their 
ignorant hearers that they speake and vnfould deepe mysteries, yet in very 
truth, nothing at all can be knowne: I shall beseech them both, to suspend 
their coniectures or beliefes herein, and to reserue their censure of me, 
whether or no I haue strained too farre, vntill the learned author of the 
Dialogues of the world, haue enriched it with the worke he hath 
composed of Metaphysikes90 
Digby’s derisive description of his critics who cannot rise “aboue the pitch of the 
outward obiects” is ambiguous.  On one hand, Digby is inveighing against the same 
(Cavalier?) anti-intellectual hedonism that Theagenes disdains in Loose Fantasies and 
which Digby perceived in himself.91 Just as likely, Digby is evoking the same language 
he uses to discredit Thomas Browne in Observations upon Religio Medici for Browne’s 
allegedly careless use of scholastic terms.92 Digby also seems to be addressing a specific 
class of scholastics, who were resistant towards recognizing the discoveries in natural 
philosophy and science.  By extension, Digby may even be backhandedly criticizing 
scholastic direct realism by his characterization of pure sensation of the external world 
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or “outward objects” as “pitch.”93 Regardless, most noteworthy of all is the fact that 
nowhere does Digby ever deny that his science is “poetike” or “like the longing dreames 
of passionate lovers.”  Rather, Digby denies that these romantic modes of his science are 
not incompatible with “reall truth” and practicality (to “be in act”).   
Digby’s science is “poetike” not just because it claims endless territory for 
discovery, but because he figures science in dramatic terms.  In his argument for the 
substantial existence of the soul and persistent identity, Digby describes the brain and 
human imagination in dramatic terms: 
Nay, if all the beautifull and ayry fantasmes, which fly about so nimbly in 
our braine, be nothing else but signes vnto in our soule, of what is without 
[outside of] vs; it is euident, that though peraduenture she would not 
without their seruice, exercise that which by errour we missename 
Thinking; yet the very same soule and thinker might be without them all: 
and consequently, without braine also; seeing that our braine is but the 
playhouse and scene, where all these faery maskes are acted: so that in 
conclusion.94 
Not only does Digby’s choice of metaphor, “faery maske,” associate intellectual activity 
with drama but it specifies the act of thinking to a particular genre of drama—the courtly 
masque.   On one hand, the brain is a scene for intellectual drama, where our memory 
and imagination can re-enact visual images, but the brain also enacts discourse as a 
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drama in search of truth.  Moreover, this drama is romantic, consistent with the 
conventions of the masque, in which we court truth, are often lost in interpretive 
thickets, the dark wood of Dante, and are misled by faeries and chimeras, as Digby 
would like to say.  While this trope of science as a “faery maske” remains undeveloped 
in the treatise, it suggests an impulse towards salvaging romance in his rationalism that 
struggles between affirming ideas, externals and language as the center of cognition. 
If Digby’s science is “poetike,” then his literary theory is likewise scientific, as 
he mixes the discourses of rhetorical theory and body theory when accounting for 
rhetorical pathetic appeals.  Seeming to invoke the principle of the great chain of being, 
Digby explains that rhetoric’s inspiration of emotion in an audience has analogies to the 
contagiousness of yawns and laughter and implicitly even to the curing of wounds with 
his powder of sympathy.  Defining rhetoric as “The art whereby we may persuade 
others, and winne them to assent vnto what we would haue them,” Digby concludes, 
“what passion soeuer we exhibite in ourselues, the same stealeth insensibly vpon thsose 
we speake vnto.”95 Digby is even echoing much of the language in his theories of 
corpuscularity (atomism) and sympathy from his discussion of the weapons 
salve/sympathetic cure-all from the former treatise.  In his chapter on attraction between 
bodies, Digby explains how vapors or steam can carry the atoms of a salve to a wound, 
so long as the wound, as a source, shares the same elemental combinations (hot and 
moist) as the vapor: 
But to make these operations of nature, not incredible; lett vs remember 
how we haue determined that euery body whatsoeuer, doth yield some 
                                                
95 Digby, Two Treatises, 381. 
 40 
steame, or vent a kind of vapour from it selfe; and consider, how they 
must needes do so most of all, that are hoat and moyst, as blood and 
milke are, and as all woundes and sores generally are. We see that the 
foote of a hare or deere leaueth such an impression where the beast hath 
passed, as a dog can discerne it a long time after: and a foxe breatheth out 
so strong a vapour, that the hunters themselues can wind it a great way of, 
and a good while after he is parted from the place. Now ioyning this, to 
the experiences we haue already allowed of, concerning the attraction of 
heate; wee may conclude that if any of these vapours do light vpon a 
solide warme body, which hath the nature of a source vnto them, they will 
naturally congregate and incorporate there; and if those vapors be ioyned 
with any medicatiue quality or body, they will apply that medicament 
better then any surgeon can apply it. Then, if the steame of blood and 
spirits, do carry with it from the weapon or cloth, the balsamike qualities 
of the salue or pouder, and with them do settle vpon the wound; what can 
follow but a bettering in it?96 
According to Digby’s analogy, we communicate passions in the same way the weapons’ 
salve communicates medicinal atoms.  Such an analogy holds, because human emotions 
(the passions) are themselves physical, unlike thoughts.  While this analogy would seem 
to level Digby’s literary theory with natural philosophy by reducing rhetorical pathetic 
appeals to physical explanations, the analogy rather exalts Digby’s natural philosophy to 
the level of literature. 
To Digby, both science and literature share the same domain of the spiritual life.  
The soul is the origin not only of moral action but intellectual activities, too, such as 
philosophy, poetry and rhetoric, since both the principles of the intellect and the will 
belong to the soul.  Thus, Socrates, in Plato’s Phaedrus, describes rhetoric as “the art of 
soul-leading [psychogogia] by means of words.”97 Rhetoric, to Plato, is not an amoral 
end unto itself, as he accuses the Sophists of treating the art, but an instrument under the 
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moral governance of philosophy.  In fact, Two Treatises seems to be conscious of the 
Phaedrus, as the epigraph of Two Treatises comes from the Phaedrus, “Animae 
naturam, absque totius natura, Sufficienter cognosci posse, existimas?” (“Do you reckon 
the nature of the soul to be able to be understood sufficiently apart entirely from 
nature?”).  Poetry and philosophy, to Digby, are both empirical arts; they cannot be 
“understood sufficiently apart entirely from nature.”  Thus, just as literature can rouse 
the passions according to physical explanations, so too can literature lead—or mislead, 
as the case may be—the souls of an audience.  As Digby argues, in an Augustinian 
fashion, poets must maintain a righteous ethos in order to create beautiful works of art: 
If those who assume the title of Poets, did ayme at this end, and would 
hold themselues strictly to it, they would proue as profitable instruments 
as any the commonwealth had: for the delightfullnesse and blithenesse of 
their compositions, inuiteth most men to be frequently conuersant with 
them; (eyther in songs, or vpon the stage, or in other Poemes) whiles the 
sober aspect and seuerity of bare precepts, deturneth many from lending a 
pleased eare to their wholesome doctrine; and what men swallow with 
delight, is conuerteth into nourishment: so that, if their drift were to settle 
in mens mindes a due valuation of vertue, and a detestation of vice, no art 
would do it more vniuersally, nor more effectually: and by it, mens hartes 
would be sett on fire to the pursuite of the one, and be shrunke vp with 
dislike and horrour against the other. But vnto such a Poet as would ayme 
at those noble effects, no knowledge of Morality, nor of the nature and 
course of humane actions and accidents must be wanting: he must be well 
versed in History; he must be acquainted with the progresse of nature, in 
what she bringeth to passe; he must be deficient in no part of Logike, 
Rhetorike, or Grammar: in a word, he must be consummate in all artes 
and sciencies, if he will be excellent in his way.98 
Without “knowledge of Morality,” “History,” natural science and the trivium liberal arts 
and “wanting” in “the nature and course of humane actions and accidents,” poets cannot 
“frame specious [beautiful] Ideas, in which the people may see, what is well done, what 
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amisse, what should be done, and what by errour is wont to be done: and to imprint in 
mens mindes a deepe conceite of the goods and euils, that follow their vertuous or 
vitious comportement in their lifes.” 
Contrary to Digby’s own assertion that his theory of cognition is ultimately 
inconsequential to his theories of discourse and literature, Digby’s anxiety to commit to 
a single conception of cognition—whether one that privileges ideas, language or the 
external as the center of thought—implies that he is constantly revising his science to 
accommodate his literary theory.  While scholars of Digby conventionally describe 
Digby’s worldview as a fusion of Aristotle, Paracelsus and Descartes, Digby’s Two 
Treatises seems to contain less of a synthetic eclectism than a pluralistic eclectism.  He 
is trying to salvage competing values (truth, romance, practicality, etc.) in his science, an 
attempt which, in the 17th century in particular, leads to more one science.  
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 The arbitrary expression of Digby’s “romantic science” in Digby’s Loose 
Fantasies and Two Treatises points to a development of thought in Digby that is not so 
much linear but branched out into a variety of interests.  Loose Fantasies not only 
responds to contemporary philosophical discourses after all, such as Cartesianism and 
materialism, but also to generic considerations of the romance.  In other words, Digby’s 
philosophical and scientific discourses in Loose Fantasies do not just participate in 
contemporary scientific discussions of Digby’s time but also participate as a mode in the 
very genre he is writing under—the narrative romance—in so far as the discourses are a 
courtly romantic drama of the mind.  Likewise does Two Treatises, despite being 
classified as a philosophical work, also responding to literary generic considerations.  
The text shifts its epistemological frameworks in order to accommodate its literary 
theory.  Digby’s “romantic science,” then, can just as accurately be described inversely 
as a “scientific romance,” for the distinction between the two modes of science and 
romance was still being constructed in Digby’s time. 
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